



Smart contracts security assessment

Final report

Tariff: Standard

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Troller token

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0xguard.com



hello@0xguard.com

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Introduction

The report has been prepared for Troller team. The code is deployed to BSC mainnet [0x77cC0eaf92D83c3220E54b3E58Da56BE40E148F8](https://bscscan.com/address/0x77cC0eaf92D83c3220E54b3E58Da56BE40E148F8). Users must check that the contracts they are interacting are the same as been audited. A recheck has been done for the updated contract deployed [0x270e18A7E4575C8Ce8c39253e5Cccec9D236A3e6](https://bscscan.com/address/0x270e18A7E4575C8Ce8c39253e5Cccec9D236A3e6).

All issues have been fixed or responded Successfully (documentation was added to the contract code). See team responses and updates below the issues description. Automated analysis checked for 26 issues and 25 were passed (96.16%).

Name	Troller token
Audit date	2021-10-07 - 2021-10-07
Language	Solidity
Platform	Binance Smart Chain

Contracts checked

Name	Address
Troller	https://bscscan.com/address/0x270e18A7E4575C8Ce8c39253e5Cccec9D236A3e6#code

Procedure

We perform our audit according to the following procedure:

Automated analysis

- Scanning the project's smart contracts with several publicly available automated Solidity analysis tools

- Manual verification (reject or confirm) all the issues found by the tools

Manual audit

- Manually analyse smart contracts for security vulnerabilities
- Smart contracts' logic check

Known vulnerabilities checked

Title	Check result
Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain	passed
Code With No Effects	not passed
Message call with hardcoded gas amount	passed
Typographical Error	passed
DoS With Block Gas Limit	passed
Presence of unused variables	passed
Incorrect Inheritance Order	passed
Requirement Violation	passed
Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	passed
Shadowing State Variables	passed
Incorrect Constructor Name	passed
Block values as a proxy for time	passed
Authorization through tx.origin	passed
DoS with Failed Call	passed
Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee	passed
Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	passed
Assert Violation	passed

State Variable Default Visibility	passed
Reentrancy	passed
Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction	passed
Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	passed
Unchecked Call Return Value	passed
Floating Pragma	passed
Outdated Compiler Version	passed
Integer Overflow and Underflow	passed
Function Default Visibility	passed

Classification of issue severity

High severity

High severity issues can cause a significant or full loss of funds, change of contract ownership, major interference with contract logic. Such issues require immediate attention.

Medium severity

Medium severity issues do not pose an immediate risk, but can be detrimental to the client's reputation if exploited. Medium severity issues may lead to a contract failure and can be fixed by modifying the contract state or redeployment. Such issues require attention.

Low severity

Low severity issues do not cause significant destruction to the contract's functionality. Such issues are recommended to be taken into consideration.

Issues

High severity issues

1. Exclude/include from rewards (Troller)

Dynamic correlation between rOwned and tOwned balances may be used by the owner to redistribute users balances for the owner's profit.

Recommendation: Refactor the includeInReward() function or remove it from the code. See detailed explanation [here](#).

Update: The function includeInReward() was removed from the code. Owner should use excludeFromReward() with extra care.

Medium severity issues

1. Ownership unlock (Troller)

unlock() function does not update _previousOwner variable. Ownership may be transferred back after renounce if function lock() was called previously.

Recommendation: Remove function if it is not going to be used.

Update: Unlock function was deleted, but code still has an issue: now the lock function effectively renounces ownership of the token.

2. Hardcoded addresses (Troller)

Hardcoded router address updated in constructor but has no specific update function.

Recommendation: Add function to update the router address to be ready for migration to the new dex version.

Update: Function to set a new router was added.

3. Liquify conditions (Troller)

Conditions in `_transfer()` function L1115 contradicts the comment L1104.

Recommendation: Update the comment or the code.

Update: Code was update to conform to the documentation.

4. Token transfers may run out of gas if big number of addresses are excluded (Troller)

Token transfers may run out of gas if big number of addresses are excluded. The `_getCurrentSupply()` loops over unlimited number of excluded addresses.

```
function _getCurrentSupply() private view returns(uint256, uint256) {
    uint256 rSupply = _rTotal;
    uint256 tSupply = _tTotal;
    for (uint256 i = 0; i < _excluded.length; i++) {
        if (_rOwned[_excluded[i]] > rSupply || _tOwned[_excluded[i]] > tSupply) return (_rTotal,
        _tTotal);
        rSupply = rSupply.sub(_rOwned[_excluded[i]]);
        tSupply = tSupply.sub(_tOwned[_excluded[i]]);
    }
    if (rSupply < _rTotal.div(_tTotal)) return (_rTotal, _tTotal);
    return (rSupply, tSupply);
}
```

Recommendation: The token owner should be extra careful when adding excluded addresses.

Update: Developers are aware of possible issue if a big number of addresses are added, extra documentation was added to the code.

Low severity issues

1. SafeMath usage (Troller)

SafeMath library is outdated and should not be used with 0.8 Solidity versions.

Recommendation: Update version of the SafeMath library

Update: Issue was fixed in the update

2. Buyback designed ineffective (Troller)

Buyback functions first swaps tokens for BNB and then swaps BNB back to token.

Update: The buyback functionality was removed from the token.

3. Swaps without slippage (Troller)

Swaps are performed with 0 slippage parameters. This means that the actual swaps will be done with 100% slippage and may be frontrun. Issue may have significant impact on big token swaps.

Recommendation: It's a common way to do the swaps in the Safemoon forks, the owners of the tokens should be aware of it when setting parameters for swaps. We recommend update documentation of the function.

Update: Comments were added in the code.

4. Wrong swap deadline (Troller)

Swap in L1235 has deadline parameter set to timestamp+300, which would not work, i.e. is always true.

Recommendation: It's a common way to do the swaps in the Safemoon forks, the owners of the tokens should be aware of it when setting parameters for swaps. We recommend update documentation of the function.

Update: Developers added comment in the code that it is an acknowledged issue.

Conclusion

Troller token Troller contract was audited. 1 high, 4 medium, 4 low severity issues were found.

All issues have been fixed or responded Successfully (documentation was added to the contract code).
See team responses and updates below the issues description.
Automated analysis checked for 26 issues and 25 were passed (96.16%).

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